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Abstract: This paper identifies and explores regulatory issues that may have an impact on the use
of flexibility services by distribution utilities to solve grid constraints. This can be done by flexible
distributed energy resources which can be instructed, for instance, to reduce export generating
capacity or increasing consumption. We want to identify how regulation can better support the
development of the future distribution utility in its role as neutral market facilitator, enabling more
competition in local flexibility markets and optimal use of resources. A set of questionnaires were
designed to capture the insights around important aspects of the regulation of flexibility markets
(utilities’ network incentives, network tariff structure, market design for flexibility markets, etc.).
These were sent to distribution utilities, energy regulators, energy marketplaces, energy associations
and relevant experts from seven jurisdictions. The responses suggest a collective interest in the
procurement of flexibility services by distribution utilities from distributed energy resources. New
regulations, the adaptation of current rules and recent consultations reflect this. However, the amount
of progress with and preferences for key regulatory changes differ across jurisdictions.
Keywords: distribution system operators; flexibility services; regulation; procurement; distribution
energy resources
1. Introduction
The trend towards higher shares of intermittent renewable electricity within the
electricity system is manifest across many jurisdictions. Much of this new generation is
connected to lower voltage electricity distribution networks rather than to the high voltage
transmission system. This creates the need to manage the fluctuations that these generators
create on the local distribution system so that network capacity constraints are not violated,
and power quality requirements are met. New electrical loads such as electric vehicles
and heat pumps also pose potential challenges for grid management. Distribution system
operators need to be adapted to these challenges [1]. Overall, this energy transition is
increasing the demand for ‘flexibility’ within the electricity distribution system where
generators, loads and new players (such as commercial batteries) are incentivized to
respond to network condition. These potential sources of flexibility within the distribution
system are known as ‘distributed energy resources’ or DER.
There are different ways that countries promote flexible electricity resources via
markets, tariffs, connections arrangements (access rights), etc. Indeed, energy regulatory
agencies in the European single market are required to provide incentives to distribution
system operators (DSOs) to procure flexibility services and standardised market products
at national level.
In Europe, the EU Clean Energy Package (CEP) [2] specifies directions of travel
regarding the need for the use of more market-based approaches for procuring flexibility
services, smart meters, data management, more active networks, etc. It also states that
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the distribution system operator (DSO) should be remunerated for the procurement of
flexibility services to allow to recover reasonable IT and infrastructure costs.
The existing literature related to flexibility markets is extensive in relation to market
design for electricity at distribution and transmission, market clearing methods, optimiza-
tion methods, role of aggregators, peer-to-peer, etc. For a brief discussion of these studies
see Section 1 of our previous paper in this Special Issue [3]. The literature about the role of
regulation in promoting the use of more flexibility, especially at distribution, needs further
expansion. This paper innovates in providing key insights from key energy parties about
the role of regulation in the transition to more active distribution utilities.
The aim of this paper is to identify and explore regulatory issues that may have an
impact on the use of flexibility solutions (with a focus on those provided by DER) by distri-
bution utilities. In line with our previous paper in this Special Issue the same jurisdictions
have been selected (Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, The Netherlands,
Norway). A set of questionnaires have been designed to capture key insights for each
of these aspects from participants, including distribution utilities, energy regulators, en-
ergy marketplace and experts (18 in total). We explore twelve regulatory issues raised by
emerging innovative solutions to the rising flexibility requirements. These issues are briefly
discussed in Section 2. This paper is based on a report that the authors performed under
the context of the MERLIN innovation project in Great Britain [4].
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
different regulatory aspects that need to be taken into consideration in the adoption of
flexibility solutions by distribution utilities. Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4
compiles and discusses the responses given by all the participants on each regulatory
aspect in turn and identifies lessons learned. Section 5 concludes.
2. How Regulators Promote Flexibility
In this section we identify a number of ways in which regulators could promote the
procurement of flexibility and investigate the extent to which the jurisdictions that we look
at have already, are in the process of, or should in the future use each of these ways to
promote flexibility. Many of these topics were initially identified in our previous paper on
the same Use Cases [5] and complemented by an additional literature review [6–11]. The
ways this could be done are highlighted in the following paragraphs. The characteristics of
the jurisdictions we look at are noted in Table 1.
Table 1. Distribution market in the seven jurisdictions.
Country














Australia (1) 15 10.45 0.75 Ausgrid 1.8 41.7 16.7%
France (2) 148 36.9 1.4 Enedis 36.0 26.5 97.6%
Germany (3) 883 51.4 1.8 Innogy (E.oN) 6.7 19.2 13.1%
Great Britain 14 29.8 0.85 UKPN 8.3 44.0 27.9%
Japan 10 70.4 0.99 Tepco 25.5 70.7 36.2%
the Netherlands 7 8.3 0.26 Liander 3.2 35.2 38.6%
Norway (5) 120 3.1 0.33 Elvia 0.9 29.0%
(1) In Australia, the total number of customers and network length exclude the ones from Western Australia region; (2) In France, the
number of DSOs includes (1) DSO and (147) local distribution utilities—ELD); (3) In Germany, E.oN took over Innogy Group in September
2019; (4) Ausgrid, Enedis, UKPN and Tepco are involved in this study; (5) In Norway, Elvia was created as a result of merging Eidsiva Nett
AS and Hafslund Nett AS in January 2020. Source: [12–24], utilities’ websites.
The way in which network operators are regulated may influence distribution utilities’
preferences between the use of traditional solutions (i.e., reinforcement), flexible solutions
or a combination of the two [25]. In all the jurisdictions that are part of this study, except
for Japan, incentive regulation is the mechanism used to regulate distribution networks
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(via a revenue or price cap), with different levels of sophistication across jurisdictions. The
totex approach (which provides the freedom to select either opex or capex to meet network
demands) looks superior to non-totex approaches which may bias network expenditure
towards capex or opex based solutions. One of the things we want to know is whether the
current regulatory mechanism (including ongoing or future proposals), can incorporate
the value of flexibility in the regulatory revenue or price formula.
The use of flexibility services by distribution utilities may also be encouraged by a
more cost reflective tariff structure, such as tariffs for the use of the networks and connection
charges. The use of standardized definitions of flexibility products or services may also
help to promote flexibility services. This facilitates the development of deeper markets
with more participants.
Regulators can also play an important role in specifying the market design for flexibil-
ity markets. Appropriate market designs can help to capture the value that decentralized
resources such as DER can provide to the electricity system [26]. The role of the distribution
utility as a neutral market facilitator is a possibility that is envisaged in the future. In fact,
jurisdictions are already experimenting with this approach to evaluate the viability and
any potential regulatory intervention. Facilitating flexibility trading between third parties
where the distribution utility may act as an intermediary is an example of being a neutral
market facilitator. The role of DSOs in facilitating peer-to-peer (P2P) flexibility trading is
also something we explore.
Smart meters are key enablers of unlocking flexibility resources within the distribution
system. Regulators may need to change the rules framework for smart meters to fully
exploit the potential of flexibility arising from the existence and use of smart meters.
Another related issue for regulators is rules on participation of aggregators in flexibility
markets. This has the advantage of unlocking small DERs, but the disadvantage of breaking
the link between physical ownership and operation and market participation and allowing
‘virtual’ market participation.
Managing and procuring flexibility to solve network constraints, congestion, etc.,
requires more active networks and more coordination between network operators (i.e.,
distribution utilities and transmission system operators). Better coordination is required
among parties for a more cost-efficient, sustainable and reliable system operation [27],
which leads to lower costs for users of the electricity grid. This coordination can be
encouraged via regulation [28]. An important part of this coordination can be allowing
DSOs to procure flexibility on behalf of transmission system operators (TSOs). We want to
know how jurisdictions are progressing in this field and the instruments (if any) they are
using to enhance coordination between DSOs and TSOs.
Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) for smaller generators are a potential source of inflexibility within
the distribution system because generators are paid a fixed price regardless of market or
system conditions. Changes to FiT regulation can facilitate greater participation of DER in
flexibility markets.
Access and management of customer data (including DER customers) is critical to
capture and maximise the value of flexibility across all parties (e.g., network operators,
customers, retailers/suppliers, aggregators). The integration of DER creates opportunities
but also challenges. Technological advances can help to have more automated systems to
control and monitor data, but regulatory intervention may still be needed to set standards
of best practice. Data needs to be interoperable, accurate, accessible, and regulation can
help with this.
Finally, the creation of a standard social cost benefit methodology for the evaluation
of flexibility services can promote the appropriate procurement of flexibility. Indeed, one
might expect the absence of a regulator approved methodology is likely to lead to unsus-
tainable inconsistencies in flexibility procurement between DSOs in a single jurisdiction.
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3. Methodology
In order to capture key insights about the way in which regulatory frameworks (associ-
ated with each of the topics highlighted in the previous section) can facilitate and encourage
the use of flexibility by network operators, two similar questionnaires were designed and
sent to representatives of the seven jurisdictions, see Appendix A. In these jurisdictions,
there are some indication of supportive regulatory frameworks for the use of flexibility
services by network operators and information about recent innovative projects/initiatives
and trials that favor the use of flexibility services to solve network constraints.
Questionnaire 1 looks at the regulatory framework that supports the use of flexibility
services from a general perspective. This questionnaire was sent to regulatory energy au-
thorities, energy associations and relevant experts. Questionnaire 2 looks at the regulatory
framework too but with a focus on the Use Cases evaluated in our previous paper in this
Special Issue. This questionnaire was sent to the parties involved in these initiatives such
as distribution utilities and marketplace platforms. The two questionnaires can be found in
Appendix B.
The questionnaires aim to capture for each regulatory topic what has been already
changed (past), and what is currently under consideration (present) and what should be
changed (future). In some cases “changes currently in consideration” or those that “should
be changed” may also refer to things that have already been reported as changed. In
addition, considering that not all the changes have the same importance or priority, we
provide the opportunity to identify the top 3. We think that the diversity of parties and the
mix of experiences provide a more comprehensive indication about the role of regulation
associated with the deployment of flexibility markets in each jurisdiction from different
business perspectives.
We have received a total of 18 questionnaires (out of 23 sent) over the period June
to July 2020. We have at least one key organization per each jurisdiction (i.e., the regu-
latory authority or the largest distribution utility) with a maximum of 7 representatives
per jurisdiction.
The questionnaire is not a representative survey given the small number of highly
specialized individuals who know about these topics. In the existing literature, we can find
surveys that involve energy related topics such as willingness to pay for renewable energy,
energy saving technologies, renewable microgeneration, with diverse methods such as
factor analysis, econometrics, etc. [29–31], but not related to flexibility services and market
design which is still a work in progress even in most advanced economies.
What we are trying to get at with the questionnaires is a general impression of the
issues in particular jurisdictions provided by informed participants. The following steps
were followed.
- First, we summarise our overall impression per each regulatory topic (12 in total, iden-
tified in [4]), such as the number of jurisdictions and respondents that acknowledge
changes or potential changes to the associated topic and the most relevant ones for
them (top 3 only).
- Second, we use a country-level summary table per each topic (placed at the start of
each subsection) to give an overview of the respective responses. If at least one of the
participants confirmed: (1) any existing change, or (2) changes being considered or
changes that should be considered, we mark the country response as a “Yes”.
- Third, we discuss specific differences between respondents (per each country) in
the text that follows. We also support the responses and discussion in each subsec-
tion, with additional literature review and references from their respective national
regulatory agencies, distribution utilities and other organisations.
Unsurprisingly, there is a lot nuance between individual participants in the survey
who work for different organisations. However, there is also a lot of agreement, given that
at the national level many of the individuals know each other and interact in the same
industry fora.
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4. Survey Findings
This section summarises the responses provided by the 18 participants from the
7 jurisdictions involved in this study and identifies main findings. Table 2 summarises the
responses per type of participant.
Table 2. Summary of participants per country.
Summary of Responses AU FR DE GB JP NL NO Total
Regulator 1 1 1 1 1 5
Distribution utilities 1 1 1 3 1 7
Energy Associations 1 1 2
Platforms/marketplaces 2 1 3
Experts 1 1
number of responses 3 1 2 7 2 1 2 18
4.1. Changes to Utilities’ Revenue Incentives
Respondents from three jurisdictions acknowledge changes to the utilities’ revenue
incentives that may favor the use of flexibility. Respondents from 5 jurisdictions (a total of
10 out of 18 responses) have indicated current or future changes to the utilities ‘revenue
incentives that facilitate the use of flexibility. Change to utilities revenue incentives ranks
first in the identification of top 3 issues by the respondents (8 out of 18) in four jurisdictions
(see Table 3).
Table 3. Changes to utilities’ revenue incentives—response summary.
Utilities’ Revenue Incentives AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes yes yes
In Japan, one of the respondents mentions a recent change in the price control method-
ology, moving from rate of return (cost-of-service regulation) to incentive regulation (rev-
enue cap), to be implemented in 2023.
In The Netherlands, the respondent remarks that there are no specific incentives
to promote the procurement of flexibility, but the regulatory scheme adopted (yardstick
competition based on totex) gives the opportunity for distribution utilities to select the most
efficient mix of expenses: opex (i.e., procuring flexibility) and capex (i.e., conventional grid
reinforcement). It was suggested that the distribution utilities may get limited additional
revenues that are relatively small in comparison to the incurred operational costs. The
size of the revenue is equal to the incremental capacity made available through congestion
management times the regulated tariff. On top of this, it may be the case that those DSOs
that spend more on capex (i.e., timely investment in network reinforcement) perform better
in comparison to the benchmark and those that procure flexibility to manage congestion
with relatively high opex performing worse. This is something that is currently under
evaluation by the regulator.
In Germany, one of the respondents points out an ongoing discussion on efficiency
incentives for congestion management. For instance, based on the current regulatory
framework, distribution utilities are allowed to compensate controllable loads or feed-
in generation (generators are entitled to 95% of the missed revenue capped to 1% of
revenue of total power production) in the case of network constraints (i.e., by controlling
their loads or via curtailment, respectively), further details are provided in Section 4.2.
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Compensation costs (i.e., feed-in generation) are classified as permanently “non controllable
cost” and therefore are not included in efficiency benchmarking. On the other hand,
market-related measures are allocable as operating costs and included in the efficiency
benchmarking. There are no incentives for distribution utilities to look for more efficient
solutions (i.e., flexibility via a market-based approach) [32]. Another respondent suggests
that the obligation that DSOs have in connecting 100% of generators that produce electricity
from renewable sources (under the Renewable Act—EEG), makes it impossible to foresee
the need for connection capacity building on the use of flexibility. The EEG gives generators
of electricity from renewable resources priority in grid connection and in dispatch order
(see §8 and §11 from EEG).
In Australia, one respondent points to a scheme to support distribution utilities to
find non-network options with a focus on demand management, up to around $1billion
over five years: the demand management incentive scheme and innovation allowance. The
first one has three features: cost uplift (size of the incentive cap to 50% of expected costs),
net benefit constraint (incentive cannot be higher than project’s expected net benefits) and
overall incentive constraint (total incentive cannot exceed 1% of the distribution business
allowed revenue for the same year). The second one is a demand management R&D
fund [33].
In GB, many of the respondents agree that a change has already been made with
the introduction of a totex regulatory model in RIIO ED1 price control in 2015. The RIIO
(Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs) framework is applied to electricity and
gas networks. One respondent points out that the totex regulatory model is critical and
is evolving with some key changes for the next five- year regulatory period (RIIO ED2)
starting in April 2023. One of lessons learned from the current price control is that overall
costs to consumers have been too high. Among the drivers of this is underspend against
allowances and rewards from quality incentives (i.e., Interruptions Incentive Scheme—
IIS), [34]. Some of the key changes are: (1) the introduction of a Net Zero re-opener in
response to Net Zero GHG emissions targets set in the UK by 2050 allowing the price control
to be adaptable; (2) a set of obligations, incentives and deliverables; (3) strategic investment
models; (4) an innovation fund (SIF) that will replace the RIIO-1 network innovation
competition (NIC); (5) enabling whole system solutions; and (6) the introduction of a CAM
(Coordinated Adjustment Mechanism) re-opener [35]. It was mentioned that procuring
flexibility can save totex (e.g., by reinforcement avoidance or deferral expenditure) but also
means lower regulatory asset value (RAV) and that more incentives to manage uncertainty
(i.e., load growth) via flexibility are needed. It is also suggested that these should be part of
totex. Another respondent suggests the consideration of linking flexibility with outputs and
with the benefits that this can bring to the whole system. A third remarks that no-additional
change is required to the current scheme for the procurement of flexibility services: there are
sufficient incentives for distribution utilities. One of the marketplace respondents indicates
the need to incorporate flexibility within the distribution companies’ (DNOs’) business
model and incentives to use it rather than BAU approaches (i.e., traditional reinforcement).
Many of the jurisdictions use revenue cap regulation based on totex, which gives
more freedom to the distribution utility to select the best combination of costs (operational
and capital). What we observe is that even though these models are considered superior,
distribution utilities are not necessarily encouraged to use flexibility as an alternative
option (even if it can be the most cost-efficient solution). The way these costs are recovered
plays an important role in this. If these costs are categorized as non-controllable costs,
then they cannot be part of a benchmark and hence there is no incentive to reduce them
via competitive procurement. Even if totex is benchmarked flexibility solutions may
be discouraged due to exposure to cost penalties (e.g., in the Netherlands). Regulation
should promote the use of flexibility when it is the most cost-efficient option. The number
of participants that acknowledge ongoing changes or future changes shows that some
improvements to the current models are still required.
Energies 2021, 14, 4073 7 of 25
4.2. Changes to Network Tariff Structure
Changes to network tariff structure have been reported in two jurisdictions only. Even
though, in most jurisdictions (6 out of 7) changes to network tariff structure are being
considered or should be considered according to the respondents (15 out of 18). Network
tariff structure is among the 3 top regulatory changes according to respondents (7 out of
18), and the one with the highest level of consensus across the seven jurisdictions (5 out of
7). Table 4 summarises the responses.
Table 4. Changes to network tariff structure—response summary.
Network Tariff Structure AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes yes yes yes
In Norway, a proposal to modify the current network tariff structure to low voltage
(LV) customers (e.g., households, vacation homes, smaller commercial business) has been
made [35]. A new capacity-based tariff design (currently mainly volumetric without
incentives to reduce capacity) to LV customers has been proposed. At present only a
few DSOs have already implemented capacity tariffs. It is important to note that the
proposal for a new tariff design does not change the revenue cap model used by NVE
to regulate the DSOs (yearly income cap). The determination of tariffs should be within
their income cap. Three models of potential tariff design are recommended, in all of them
the energy charge is equivalent to the marginal cost of network losses (only if capacity is
not constrained). DSOs may adopt one of them or a combination of them. If the DSOs
face capacity constraints, the energy charge may reflect this in the form of a price signal
(e.g., via time-of-use differentiation), which may involve dynamic or static pricing [36].
However, the proposal does not specify whether this price should be included, or how it
can be regulated. According to the proposal, a short-term capacity constraint flexibility
can be an option (i.e., via a market-based approach), where the price is defined by the
market instead. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the introduction of this price signal may
add more complexity to the tariff design. Another respondent has suggested the need to
have tariff structures aligned with the development of flexibility markets. In the case of a
constraint, flexibility assets that operate at a specific time of the day can be penalized, then
market signals should be used instead.
In The Netherlands, according to one respondent the limitations of the current tariff
design have been explored in terms of: (1) the use of a uniform capacity-based tariff
for residential consumers introduced in 2009 [37]; (2) the lack of level a playing field in
the flexibility market between both consumption and injection; (3) penalties applied to
larger consumers when consumption is increased; and (4) non-existent locational signals in
distribution tariffs. Another barrier that has been acknowledged is the consideration of a
maximum producer tariff set at €0.50 per MWh (generators). According to the respondent,
the introduction of tariffs for producers would make the current network tariff more robust.
The introduction of more flexible tariffs (i.e., dynamic pricing) has been assessed in a
recent study [38]. The results suggest that the time is not yet right to implement dynamic
pricing. Among the reasons are the conflict with the current tariff scheme (based on static
rates for each tariff category that are the same through the year regardless of location),
the higher administrative burden and the need for more complex regulation. If dynamic
pricing did exist, the purchase of flexibility (services) via a competitive mechanism would
be preferred instead.
In Germany, one of the respondents points out that changes regarding the connection
and control of electric vehicles and heat pumps are being considered. In line with the
current regulatory framework (Section 14a Energy Industry Act—EnWG), suppliers and
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end consumers are entitled to a discount in the distribution network tariff in exchange
for transferring the control of the customer’s devices connected at LV (i.e., controllable
loads) to adjust their consumption in case of network constraints. However, the size of
the discount is not regulated and varies considerably across distribution utilities (c. 883
DSOs) with an average reduction of 55% equivalent to 3.44 ct/kWh (with the lowest and
highest discount of 6% and 91%, respectively) [14]. Distribution utilities are required to
meet this obligation, even though there may be no benefit to them. Defined network
segments above a specific capacity could help [28]. Then, what is still missing is the
framework for the reduction in network charges and contractual arrangements (i.e., control
actions reserved by distribution utilities and those by suppliers). Section 14a of the EnWG
is currently under revision. Different options for controlling flexible loads are being
evaluated including the establishment of a few hours a day for controlling the loads in case
of constraints and differentiation in network access (i.e., conditional and unconditional
access with thresholds).
In Australia, one respondent notes recent network access and tariff reforms pro-
posed/actioned by a distribution utility (South Australian Power Distribution) and already
approved by the regulator. The aim of these reforms is to manage minimum demand in
the midday due to excess solar generation. A new tariff scheme based on time in use will
be applied from 1 July 2021. The scheme proposes a “solar sponge” structure with the
lowest off-peak rates at midday, for details see [39]. A modification of the export limit
scheme (currently static and set at 5 kW) is also acknowledged. Households with rooftop
capacity will have the opportunity in 2021 (targeted) to choose between static or dynamic
export limits (to be set based on real-time network conditions). The dynamic scheme offers
a higher export limit to customers, but export restrictions (i.e., curtailment) will be applied
by the distribution utility (occasionally) in order to remain within network capacity limits
(especially when grid voltage rises). Customers will export solar energy around 97% of
the time. Other respondents agree that adequate network tariff structure contributes to a
more equitable approach. This can be in the form of more locational pricing, local settle-
ment rules and allowing pricing on exports to the grid. A recent policy consultation [40],
proposes three rule change requests that aim to facilitate the efficient integration of DER
for the grid of the future [41]. These changes require the provision of the right incentives
to distribution utilities to provide export services to DER and the establishment of the
correct export charges. An amendment of the National Electricity Rules (NER) which
mandates the economic regulation of distribution utilities in the National Electricity Market
(NEM) may be required. Currently NEM regulation (clause 6.4) does not allow distribution
utilities to charge use of system charges for export services (costs recovered via connection
charges and consumption charges). Considering that the service classification sets the type
of economic regulation (i.e., distribution services currently linked to consumption), it is
important to clarify and to re-define the definition/scope of distribution services.
In France, it was acknowledged by the respondent that flexibility and network tariffs
are two different and complementary ways to increase investment options, help grid
optimization and to prevent constraints. It is an ongoing discussion with the energy
regulator to include the cost of procuring flexibility in the distribution tariff for the next
regulatory period (Turpe 6). A closer look at recent regulator (CRE) consultations [42]
shows the consideration of dynamic pricing to make recommendations related to the
implementation of dynamic pricing as suggested in European Directive 2019/944.
In Great Britain, one of the respondents points out an ongoing reform of network
access and charges (Electricity Network Access and Forward-Looking Charging Significant
Code Review—SCR) launched in December 2018. This evaluation covers four policy areas
(access rights for transmission and distribution, distribution charges (DUoS), distribution
connection charging boundary and transmission charges (TNUoS)). Shortlisted options
were identified [43]: in terms of access rights (e.g., improved options for non-firm connec-
tions, tradable access within same local area), distribution connection charging boundary
(e.g., move to a shallow(er) approach, alternative payments), distribution charges (e.g., use
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of forecast of incremental reinforcement needed at extra HV, consideration of an ultra-long
run cost model, the introduction of more granular zones for charging and time bands for
time of use charges) and transmission charges (e.g., change to reference node, consider-
ation of time of use bands and/or agreed capacity rights). A closer look at the relevant
documentation suggests that access right reforms (definition and choices) are focused on
larger users, dynamic charges for both transmission and distribution are not an option now,
and that non- available/inaccurate network data is behind the exclusion of some potential
reforms. Another respondent expresses concerns about whether more granularity and
dynamic network tariffs will be beneficial, suggesting that it can be low at lower voltages.
A different respondent suggests that the procurement of flexibility (i.e., via markets) by
distribution utilities should be limited to being used against load related reinforcement for
demand in line with the current charging boundary.
Comprehensive reform of both transmission and network charges to be more dynamic
in time and space is something that is on the agenda of several jurisdictions, but all the
jurisdictions that we have looked at are proceeding cautiously on this. Full dynamic nodal
pricing, at every conceivable node where DER flexibility might make a difference is some
way off. However, there have been some interesting developments to better reflect costs
particularly for solar export, which is becoming significant in some jurisdictions. There
seems little doubt that creative (i.e., targeted) use of price signals delivered via network
charges can encourage DER flexibility.
4.3. Changes to Definition of Products/Service and Standardization
Only in a few jurisdictions is it acknowledged that a change in the definition of
products/services and standardization facilitates the procurement of flexibility. However,
respondents from four jurisdictions report current changes under consideration or agree
that changes should be considered (8 out of 18). This has been placed as one of the top 3 by
two respondents only (see Table 5).
Table 5. Changes to definition of products/services and standardization—response summary.
Definition of Products/Services
and Standardisation AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes
In GB, different respondents confirm the existence of a standard set of flexibility
products for distribution utilities [44]. In light of this, another respondent points out that
changes to licenses are being made in coordination with the system operator and other
stakeholders. A third respondent notes the need for a “technology agnostic” product and
for product standardisation when considering an increase in the number of interfaces and
platforms. Standardised and adaptive products are also recommended for the procurement
of flexibility by the GB regulator [45].
In The Netherlands, the respondent suggests the introduction of two products as a
result of the adaptation of network codes to improve rules on congestion management by
distribution utilities: (1) a capacity constraint product and (2) a redispatch product; to be
used before and after closing the day-ahead market, respectively.
In Norway, one of the respondents points to ongoing trials that aim to evaluate
new products, bid size, etc. (e.g., a pilot for 1MW balancing bids and a pilot for fast
frequency reserves).
A lot of attention has been given to product standardization already across our ju-
risdictions. However, there is some concern that instead of specifying the product, the
underlying characteristics should be specified as it is these that consumers value and that
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this would allow the trading of products of different qualities provided by very different
DER. This is in line with the recommendation of [46] on the rationalization of frequency
response markets, where the time to respond should be valued explicitly in the evaluation
of bids process rather than narrowly be part of the product definition.
4.4. Specification of Market Design Rules for Local Flexibility Markets
Except for one jurisdiction (The Netherlands), the market design for local flexibility
markets has not been settled. However, many of the respondents agree that changes are
being considered or should be considered (in 5 out of 7 jurisdictions). Like the previous two
changes, market design rules for local flexibility markets are among the top three changes
selected by the respondents (see Table 6).
Table 6. Specification of market design rules for local flexibility markets—response summary.
Market Design for Local
Flexibility Markets AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes Yes
top 3 yes yes yes yes
In The Netherlands, one of the respondents mentions key developments that relate to
flexibility markets such as the development of a platform for local congestion management
(Grid Operators Platform for Congestion Solutions—GOPACS [47], one of the Use Case
discussed in our first paper in this Special Issue). This makes use of ETPA (a market energy
platform) for clearing the market, for details see [5].
In Japan, one respondent suggests that there is no official plan to create local flexibility
markets, but a review of the international experience is being undertaken in the expert
meeting on the Platform for Distributed Energy Systems [48]. They also mentioned the
funding support from government (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry-METI) for
demonstrators (e.g., VPP, P2P). Another suggests that some progress is noticeable and
points to the creation of the Expert Committee for flexibility markets also known as “Supply-
Demand Adjustment Market”, with the aim of discussing a potential market design (e.g.,
flexibility menus, bidding methods).
In Norway, one respondent acknowledges the establishment of a framework for pilot
and demonstration projects [49], with two main purposes: “to provide better information
about regulations and make the application process if necessary for dispensation later”. Five
dispensations have been identified to date. The need for trials before implementing
permanent regulatory changes has been acknowledged. A different respondent states that
the development of flexibility markets is in its infancy and there is a need for additional
exploration to see how flexibility markets can and should develop.
In Germany, one respondent agrees that if the distribution utility maintains strict
unbundling, the creation of dedicated markets for regional flexibility at the DSO level
is needed.
In France, the respondent suggests the need for experiments to define an appropri-
ate market design. There is a current call for tenders (trials) to procure local flexibility
resources [50].
In Australia, one of the respondents suggests that the Post-2025 Market Design for
the Electricity Market (NEM)—a long term fit for purpose market framework—will sig-
nificantly change the way in which distribution and transmission networks business will
operate. In fact, this may have an important effect on the way in which local flexibility
markets will operate in Australia. For instance, as part of this initiative the Energy Security
Board (ESB) is working on a two-sided market project [51]. In a two-sided market all
participants (sellers and buyers) respond to price based on their true cost preference (i.e.,
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currently in the wholesale market demand is taken as “given” and based on forecasts). A
two-sided market would facilitate the role of the distribution utility (DNSP) as DSO in
terms of network optimisation considering DER operation and identifying constraints and
the need for services to alleviate them.
Another respondent from Australia mentions the work that the Open Energy Net-
works Project (OpEN) which aims to look for market scenarios to integrate DER into local
distribution networks. Four scenarios have been evaluated here: (1) single integrated
platforms, (2) two-step tiered platform (TST), (3) independent distribution system operator
(IDSO), and (4) hybrid. Results from the cost benefit analysis suggests that large up-front
costs would be required for their implementation, with net benefits to be captured shortly
before 2039. The size of benefits depends strongly on a high level of DER uptake. It was
recently concluded that there is no strong case to adopt any of the models in the short
term [52]. The establishment of a local flexibility market is envisaged in the long term
(i.e., the Wholesale Demand Respond Mechanism). Under this new scheme customers
will have the opportunity to participate in the wholesale demand response market directly
or via aggregators with a planned implementation date in October 2021. The mechanism
proposes a new market participant category: demand response service provider (DRSP).
Small customers have been excluded from the mechanisms, one of the main reasons is the
cost of the extension of the mechanism to this kind of customer (i.e., imposition of higher
costs to the whole system). Among other challenges are: behavioral demand response
(not suitable for scheduling), difficulties in predicting counterfactual baseline and risk of
distortionary consumer behavior [53].
In Great Britain, some respondents refer to the UK ENA Open Networks project
where the design of flexibility markets is being evaluated under Workstream 1A (Flexibility
Services). Seven products have been identified as part of this workstream and a recent
consultation has been launched: Flexibility Consultation. Another respondent indicates
that today there are enough market rules (with a particular reference to the procurement of
flexibility BAU via a marketplace). Still another suggests that local market designs need to
be rolled out via regulation to guarantee fair and transparent markets and better integration
with existing markets. Yet, another makes remarks on the importance of establishing the
roles and responsibilities of market players but suggests that doing this too early may
represent a barrier.
The market design around flexibility markets remains a work in progress across the
jurisdictions we look at. There remains a lot of experimentation and disagreement among
market players. Interestingly the idea of market scenarios for the integration of DER into
local distribution has been analysed in detail in the Australian context and rejected for
now, this shows the dependency of sustainable flexibility markets on DER deployment.
However, the non-emergence of a ‘standard market design’ does not preclude the role of
the regulator in approving market designs.
4.5. Specification of Rules for Peer-to-Peer Trading of Flexibility
Only some of the respondents from GB agree that peer-to-peer (P2P rules) may play
an important role in contracting flexibility by distribution utilities (see Table 7). In GB,
the offering of non-DSO services (i.e., P2P) is being evaluated via the Open Networks
Project (Product 6). The assessment of different trials (e.g., Transition, LEO, TraDER, Piclo
Exchange and ReFLEX projects) will help to establish the best way distribution utilities can
support non-DSO services.
P2P rules that involve distribution utilities obligations that can facilitate flexibility
trading to third parties, are not on the agenda in most of the jurisdictions. P2P is however
already working in other sectors and its application to electricity remains of interest to
many players. Distribution utilities can facilitate or act as intermediaries to secondary
trading of flexibility (i.e., ancillary services) and also curtailment. Results from the different
initiatives in GB that are testing non-DSO services will help to discover whether there is a
relevant business model for these new services.
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Table 7. Specification of rules for peer-to-peer trading of flexibility—response summary.
Peer-to-Peer Trading
of Flexibility AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed?
Change being considered or
should be considered? yes
top 3
4.6. Changes to Smart Meter Rules Framework
Changes to smart meter regulation that may favour the use of flexibility has been
reported in a few jurisdictions (3 out of 7). Respondents from four jurisdictions suggest that
changes are being considered or should be considered (9 out of 18). Only one respondent
from GB (distribution utility) places this change within their top (see Table 8).
Table 8. Changes to smart meter rules framework—response summary.
Smart Meter Rules Framework AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes
In GB, a respondent states that access to smart meter data by distribution utilities is
fundamental for low voltage (LV) visibility. Another draws attention to the role of smart
meters in allowing automated control (e.g., for EVs) facilitating the affordability of EV
flexibility. A different respondent points out the consideration of a code modification that
allows distribution utilities to control smart meters to turn on/off EV charging in the case
of a network emergency and also some modifications to half hourly settlement. However, a
different respondent suggests that smart meters are not necessarily looked at for settlement
or dispatch and acknowledges other alternatives to provide asset level monitoring. Other
respondents from GB and abroad (mainly distribution utilities) support the fact that a
change to smart meter rules should not be considered.
In France, the respondent notes the current roll out of smart meters and remarks that
their deployment will facilitate the integration of flexibility at distribution level. While in
Japan the respondent expresses a view that the revision of the Measurement Law (Act)
might be considered. In The Netherlands, the respondent comments that an adaptation to
the Meter Code is envisaged after the roll out of smart meters. This is because the allocation
procedure (i.e., based on usage profiles) would need to be adapted to actual usage instead
(registered by the smart meter). A respondent from Norway points out that the smart meter
rules came out in 2011 and that since 2019 all end-consumers have them installed (2.9 m).
We found mixed opinions across parties about the consideration of changes to smart
meter framework. There was a residual suggestion that in exceptional circumstances DSOs
should be able to control EV charging.
4.7. Changes to Rules for Independent Agregators
Changes have been reported only in one jurisdiction. France is the other one, however
it has not been reported directly in the table. Respondents from four jurisdictions (9 out of
18) suggest that changes are currently in evaluation or should be considered. Only Japan
places rules for independent aggregators as top 3 (see Table 9).
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Table 9. Changes to rules for independent aggregators—response summary.
Rules for Independent
Aggregators AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes
In Australia, one respondent points out different initiatives (including consultations)
that involve potential changes to the roles (or new roles) and market participation of aggre-
gators. There are different initiatives such as the 2-sided market proposal (i.e., definition
and roles of “traders”, see [51]), wholesale demand response (i.e., new market partici-
pant: demand response aggregator—DRA) and wholesale market only (i.e., new market
participant: small generation aggregator—SGA).
A respondent from France, notes that in comparison with other EU member states
France is already a step further in terms of independent aggregators which can freely
participate in all its markets, including in demand side response with specific rules for
this. It is expected that the demand side flexibility code does not conflict with the existing
rules. The European Commission has identified demand side flexibility as one of the two
key areas where new network codes could be required to achieve the European Green
Deal goals.
In GB one respondent suggests that aggregators have made limited progress in flexi-
bility markets. It is also acknowledged by a different respondent that distribution utilities
should not act as mandated commercial aggregators and that the adaptation to industry
codes to facilitate access to markets by independent aggregators is needed. Wider Access
changes to the Balancing and Settlement Code—BSC (Modification P344) have allowed the
participation of independent aggregators in the Balancing Mechanism (BM), previously
they could also participate but via a supplier.
In Japan, one respondent states that there are no legal restrictions on aggregators, and
an aggregator license has been evaluated by the Expert Committee. Another response
points out the release and recent revision of the Guidelines for Energy Resource Aggrega-
tion Business (ERAB).
In The Netherlands, the respondent indicates that changes to the current framework
for independent aggregators have already been evaluated and that the rules were found
to be adequate and no changes were proposed. According to the respondent there are
conflicts between aggregators and energy suppliers that aggregate individual connections
across Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs).
Aggregators play an important role in the procurement of flexibility, especially from
small-scale DER which may otherwise be prevented (depending on the size) from partici-
pating in different markets, such as wholesale, ancillary services markets, etc. Apart from
in France, who were the pioneers in allowing aggregators to participate in all markets,
it is observed that rules about independent aggregators are evolving and some conflicts
with other parties may exist. Australia and GB have introduced new market participants
oriented to independent aggregators, with the aim of encouraging their participation. There
is some variation across jurisdictions in the extent to which changes are needed to facilitate
the participation of independent aggregators in flexibility markets and reduce the chance
of conflicts with other players (i.e., with retailers).
4.8. Encouragement of Better Interaction/Coordination between Electricity Distribution and
Transmission System Operators
Respondents from three jurisdictions indicate that some changes to encourage better
coordination between distribution utilities and system operators have been already made.
Other respondents remark on current consideration of changes or their agreement that they
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should be considered in future regulation. Respondents from Australia, Great Britain and
Norway (7 out of 18) rank this change within the top 3, see Table 10.
Table 10. Encouragement of better interaction/coordination between DSOs and TSOs—response
summary.
Interaction/Coordination
between DSOs and TSOs AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes yes
A respondent from Australia points out that this change was evaluated but no agree-
ment was agreed between distribution utilities and the system operator. They pointed to
unresolved and live tensions between the decentralised and centralized approaches and the
intention of the system operator to plan and operate distribution networks. A different
respondent states that they are working with the transmission network business where
flexibility is considered as part of their joint planning.
A different perspective is noted in The Netherlands. There has been evaluation of
a joint proposal by all grid operators with respect to congestion management in lower
voltage grids. The proposal aims to clarify products and processes for a more cost-efficient
deployment of flexibility and suggests the introduction of a new role: the congestion service
provider (CSP), with the ability to aggregate small-scale flexibility.
In Germany, one of the respondents mentions an ongoing process for better coordina-
tion. In Japan, the need for coordination was not recognised because distribution operation
and transmission operation are bundled (i.e., in the form of regional network companies).
According to the respondent, an important decision has been recently made proposing
the creation of independent distribution network operators. This means that a separation
of D and T is envisaged. In Norway, one respondent points out an ongoing project that
aims to assess the current operating practices and coordination between the transmission
system operator, regional and local network operators and other key actors. An expert
group has been appointed to undertake a study, for details see [54]. The regulator has
asked the industry for inputs to the expert group’s recommendations. Another respondent
suggests that due to the transition to more decentralised systems, the distribution utility is
the most suitable party to address any issues (i.e., network constraint) in its network.
In France, it was suggested that coordination is needed because flexibility can be
required at the same grid location and needs to be addressed at different voltage levels. It
was also noted that better coordination optimises the participation of market players and
facilitates stacking of revenue streams from both parties, improving market liquidity.
In Great Britain, most respondents agree about the need for better coordination be-
tween distribution network operators and the system operator and the role of timely
regulation in this. According to them better coordination brings benefits such as system
efficiency, further market opportunities, more liquidity (i.e., revenue stacking from different
markets at distribution and transmission system levels), more competition, the avoidance
of conflict of interest (i.e., between transmission and distribution actions), identification
of key operational issues (and their origin) due to information exchange, etc. The intro-
duction of coordination obligations in the forthcoming price control (RIIO-ED2) was also
mentioned. This refers to the introduction of a whole system reopener called Coordinated
Adjustment Mechanism (CAM) proposed in the RIIO-2 Sector Specific Methodology [55].
The introduction of CAM is part of the whole system approach and a modification of the
system licence conditions for electricity distribution utilities and transmission owners is
also under evaluation. According to the GB energy regulator [56] (p. 126), CAM is defined
as follows: “A whole system focused re-opener to protect consumer interests by supporting the
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reallocation of project revenues and responsibilities to the network best placed to deliver the relevant
projects.” There are no financial incentives for distribution utilities to use the CAM. The
exploration of whole system options is expected to be BAU.
Coordination between key parties such as distribution utilities and TSOs or system
operators is vital. Many of the respondents have expressed different levels of and ways of
promoting coordination in their respective jurisdictions, including the new approach in
RIIO-ED2 in GB. With some exceptions, such as Japan and Australia, coordination rules are
still a work in progress and very much supported by the electricity sector and electricity
regulators. Better coordination brings many benefits (i.e., system efficiency, better visibility
of DER assets, data exchange, better planning and investment co-ordination, etc.). It
involves the coordination of flexibility markets to maximise benefits (who is in charge of
what, types of products to procure, etc.). This coordination should start with those able
to contract for flexibility and involve integration into existing transmission level markets
where appropriate.
4.9. New Rules That Allow Distribution Utilities to Procure Flexibility on Behalf of Transmission
Level System Operators
This type of change elicits less consensus across the parties with only some indication
that it should considered in two jurisdictions. Only two respondents (out of 18) place this
within their top 3 (see Table 11).
Table 11. Rules that allow distribution utilities to procure flexibility on behalf of transmission level
system operators—response summary.
Distribution Utilities to Procure
Flexibility Services on Behalf of TSOs AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed?
Change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes
top 3 yes
A respondent from The Netherlands points out that a collaboration between the
two parties is envisaged instead. In GB, one respondent suggests that this role has been
evaluated (in ENA World A) but no decision/implementation has been made. Another
respondent supports this approach and suggests that distribution utilities should be able
to access transmission level flexibility if is the most cost-efficient solution.
Perhaps surprisingly, this is not seen as a big issue among our jurisdictions. This is
possibly because as of now DSOs and TSOs are currently operating in different markets for
flexibility. However, there is some hint that at some point they may begin to compete with
one another to provide services to support the electricity grid which will raise issues to do
with jurisdiction and control hierarchy, along the lines suggested by [57].
4.10. Changes to Feed-in-Tariff Regulation
Changes to feed-in-tariff regulation is one of the changes that has already been made
in five jurisdictions according to many participants. Participants from four jurisdictions
state that a change in being considered or should be considered. In only two jurisdictions
changes to feed-in-tariff regulation is placed in the top 3 (see Table 12).
In GB one respondent reports a recent change—the introduction of the smart export
guarantee (SEG)—which offers a payment to small scale low carbon generators for elec-
tricity exported to the grid. Another respondent suggests that export/self-consumption
should be maximised from FIT assets. A third indicates the end of the scheme in March
2019 and that no changes are being considered now.
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Table 12. Changes to feed-in-tariff regulation– response summary.
Feed-in-Tariff Regulation AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes yes yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes
In Japan, one respondent communicates a recent change: the adoption of Feed-in-
Premium—FIP (in addition to the existing FIT). In The Netherlands, the respondent ref-
erences the SDE++ (Stimulation of Sustainable Energy Transition scheme), based on a
Feed-in-Premium and also a regulation applicable to residential customers with solar
panels where customers are allowed to offset the amount of electricity consumed with
electricity produced. It is acknowledged that due to the avoidance of different charges by
these customers (i.e., energy taxes) inter alia, the government has announced the end of
the scheme.
Feed-in-tariff schemes have been implemented some time ago and the mechanism
has evolved too. An example of this is the Feed-in-Premium (FIP) that introduced a
market-based component in the price or compensation given to the owner of renewable
generator (or other type of low carbon asset), such as SDE++ from the Netherlands. Current
changes or future changes to feed-in-tariffs that encourage the use of flexibility have been
acknowledged by a few respondents. In most cases, it is not clear how to easily incentivise
participation in flexibility markets by small FiT generators, considering the fixed amount
that owners of DER are entitled to via their original feed-in-tariff scheme. Ideally the
decision to opt for flexibility should be driven by the market however, this is not always
the case. For instance, in Germany CHP plants receive a generous allowance in the form
of direct support scheme incentives, avoided network tariffs and income from providing
heating, all of which bypass the true electricity price signal (16% of electricity consumption
is generated via CHP plants in Germany).
4.11. Improvements to Customer Data Management and Access
Changes to the rules regarding customer data management and access have been
acknowledged in only two jurisdictions. However, respondents from most jurisdictions
have confirm current changes are being considered or agree that these should be consid-
ered, with a high level of consensus (15 out of 18 respondents). Respondents from four
jurisdictions have placed this change within the top 3. Table 13 shows the results.
In Australia, one respondent comments on a recent consultation from [58] about the
minimum DER technical requirements (DER are largely unmonitored and uncoordinated
as of now), including interoperability requirements (which includes data monitoring and
exchanges, communication capabilities, and controllability/coordination). The consultation
is a response to the recent recommendation made by the Energy Security Board (ESB) in
March 2020 to put in place minimum DER technical standards by October 2020. Another
respondent discusses the limitations that distribution utilities have on customer flexibility
data, and the limitations that customers have to capture the value of flexibility.
The respondent from France notes that the implementation of flexibility at lower
voltages requires the analysis of key data (i.e., load curve, geographical position, etc.),
which is also useful to improve sourcing of sites by DER. In Japan, one respondent points
out the need for a common social platform to visualise available capacity and location of
DER to make the best use of DER. While in Norway, it was suggested that centralisation and
data access is essential if we are to move to a more automated and integrated energy system.
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Table 13. Improvements to customers data management and access—response summary.
Customer Data Management
and Standardisation AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed? yes yes
change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes yes yes
In The Netherlands there is an upcoming broad array of changes to current data
management regulation to be introduced in the Energy Law 1.0 (which integrates the
current Electricity Law, Gas law and Clean Energy Package legislation). The respondent
advocates additional changes in data management as part of the adaption of the network
code (i.e., submission of production/consumption data to grid operators for the next day),
however there are some concerns regarding the predictions from grid users and difficulties
in determining the baseline from which to measure flexibility. As a result, distribution
utilities still rely on internal grid models (i.e., congestion forecasting).
In Great Britain, the Energy Data Taskforce report was mentioned [59], where a set
of recommendations currently at various stages of implementation have been provided,
regarding the way in which government and industry can combine efforts to unlock
system benefits and to maximise customer benefits. As a result of those recommendations,
the regulator requires network companies to undergo effective digitalisation and discuss
their digitalisation strategies in their Business Plans. Two licence obligations will be
introduced for distribution utilities in RIIO-ED2: (1) the publication of updated companies’
Digitalisation Strategy & Action Plan and on (2) the use of data. Another respondent points
out that as part of the distribution utilities’ privacy plans, they are required to prepare data
privacy plans which state the way in which they would anonymise the data, including the
expected benefits from access to data. However, access to smart meter data due to privacy
issues was also noted by one respondent, suggesting that distribution utilities in GB are
forbidden from accessing a single user’s data and must rely on suppliers or aggregators to
bring domestic participation to market.
There is consensus that data is a key enabler especially at lower voltages. The ini-
tiatives described above confirm this. Technological advances (i.e., digitalisation) can
facilitate this but regulatory intervention is needed to set obligations, including technical
requirements (i.e., interoperability). We observe that the rules regarding data management
and access (including DER data) are being set out in different regulatory documenta-
tion/consultations and Energy Laws. Lack of data (or access to it) may have an adverse
impact on the establishment of more robust regulation that promotes the use of flexibility.
For instance, regulators may prefer to exclude the implementation of new rules due to data
non-availability or inaccuracy. Reciprocity is important too, so that not only distribution
utilities can benefit from this (i.e., better planning, cost efficient investments, better visibility,
etc.) but also end customers.
4.12. Creation of Standard Cost Benefit Methodology for the Evaluation of Flexibility Services at
Distribution Level
No jurisdiction we looked at has reported the introduction of a common methodology
to evaluate flexibility at the distribution level. However, respondents from four jurisdictions
(9 out of 18) report ongoing discussions where it is being considered or agree that the
introduction of the methodology should be considered, see Table 14.
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Table 14. Creation of standard cost benefit methodology for the evaluation of flexibility services at
distribution level—response summary.
Standard Methodology for Evaluating
Flexibility at Distribution AU FR DE GB JP NL NO
already changed?
Change being considered or should
be considered? yes yes yes yes
top 3 yes yes yes
In Australia, respondents note a proposal to assess the value of DER integration
(VaDER), which aims to provide a common framework to evaluate the costs incurred by
distribution utilities to accommodate DER on their networks. The study also considers the
societal impact such as carbon reduction benefits [60].
A respondent from Germany points out that incentives for the use of flexibility by
distribution utilities are poor or non-existent. There is a need for a clear incentive to claim
costs for flexibility procurement (i.e., via regulated opex) and for more guidance on a cost
benefit analysis (CBA) methodology that would be accepted by the regulator.
Respondents from GB confirm the proposal of a new flexibility methodology devel-
oped by the Open Networks Project, along with other key products. The methodology
takes into account networks costs and the value of reinforcement deferral, wider network
and societal impacts (e.g., network losses, changes in CMLs and CI driven by the asset
condition, carbon emissions, etc.), [61]. One respondent notes the importance of having
a common methodology to reduce risks of under or over pricing that may produce an
adverse impact on flexibility providers or consumers. The respondent also suggests that
even though there are indicative prices for flexibility published by distribution utilities (i.e.,
via Piclo), there is no common methodology yet in place that can explain future price risk.
In The Netherlands, it is reported that no standard methodology has been created
or is under consideration by the regulator. However, an initiative from a working group
of network users and distribution utilities is noted. The working group has developed a
methodology that assists distribution utilities to evaluate flexible solutions versus more
traditional alternatives. The proposed method ensures that the solution is deployed with
the lowest socialised costs. According to the working group, the idea is that the distribution
utilities take this methodology into consideration in their capacity planning process.
In Norway, one respondent states that a methodology that considers flexibility is
already in place as part of the requirements of the biannual investment planning report
from the distribution utilities. A different respondent remarks on the importance of having
a common methodology to encourage the distribution utility to procure flexibility in local
markets and to increase economic welfare. A different approach is observed in France. The
respondent suggests that the CBA will depend on the grid structure or topology of the
distribution utility which may be exposed to different risks and policies.
A common cost benefit methodology for evaluating flexibility solutions versus tradi-
tional ones (i.e., network reinforcement, others) is important and should be a joint work
between key energy stakeholders, including the energy regulator. We observe that most
of our jurisdictions are working on or have already proposed a kind of methodology that
aims to promote the use of flexibility as part of BAU solutions. Having a common method-
ology that can be used by distribution utilities is crucial, adds transparency to decision
making and should be aligned (if applicable) with any other that the regulator or other
energy authority have developed. It is important that the methodology also considers
societal benefits and is technologically agnostic. For instance, in GB the methodology is
aligned with the CBA tool for network investment decisions that the regulator applies to
distribution utilities in their evaluation of business plans, but it is not yet fully aligned with
the central government’s Green Book methodology for public policy appraisal [62].
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5. Summary Findings and Conclusions
This paper explores different regulatory changes that may be required to incentivise
the use of flexibility by distribution utilities in 7 jurisdictions. This flexibility, in the form of
specific services that can help for instance to solve network constraints, can be provided by
different types of distributed energy resources. The better integration of them, supported
by suitable regulation, may encourage distribution utilities to adopt more flexible solutions
offered by third parties in order to solve grid issues.
A couple of questionnaires were sent to key parties including energy regulators,
distribution utilities, energy associations and energy marketplace platforms to capture
their views. We received and evaluated 18 responses. We acknowledge that one of the
limitations of this study is the number of responses, however we note that this is not a
representative survey and that what we seek is a general impression of the main regulatory
issues identified by the respondents within their jurisdictions. The evaluation of diverse
perspectives is what we stress in this study.
We would suggest that there is much that can be learned from the experience and
analysis arising from the six other jurisdictions with respect to flexibility markets, even for
a leading jurisdiction such as Great Britain. We would highlight the following.
First, even where flexibility markets (e.g., in The Netherlands) are highly developed
and incentives—in the form of the DSO revenue model and tariff structure—exist it remains
unclear as to whether they are cost effective at a sustainable scale and whether current
regulation is fit for purpose (i.e., does not penalise the adoption of flexible solutions when
it seems the most cost-efficient option).
Second, more dynamic network tariffs have been or are being considered in several
jurisdictions, but all jurisdictions remain cautious as to the practicality of their implementa-
tion (even in France which has a single large DSO capable of widely socializing the impact
across all non-flexible customers). What we would expect is that network tariff design
would not deter the provision of flexibility services by those that want to offer them.
Third, while there are moves across multiple jurisdictions to specify and standardize
flexibility products it remains unclear as to whether this is the optimal way to handle
customer willingness to pay which is not a function of the flexibility product but of
its characteristics.
Fourth, the market design of flexibility markets is a work in progress, and we remain
in an experimentation phase. Sophisticated market designs are being considered and, in
some cases, do not appear to pass a cost benefit test (such as the different market scenarios
proposed to integrate DER into local distribution networks in Australia). What seems to be
an issue is the locational nature of some flexibility services which can deter competition
and reduce market liquidity. A larger deployment of DER and more participation from
them could change this in the future.
Fifth, there is little interest across our jurisdictions in peer-to-peer trading as an issue in
current debates about flexibility markets. The focus, outside GB, remains on procurement
by the DSO to meet its own needs.
Sixth, the facilitation of increased co-ordination between TSOs and DSOs is actively
being pursued across most of the jurisdictions where unbundling is in place. Australia
exhibits some signs of active conflict between the TSOs and DSOs in some areas which
needs to be addressed. There is therefore a clear need for further regulatory guidance
especially related to data sharing between DSOs and TSOs for optimal network operation
and stacking of revenues (in different or within the same timescales).
Seventh, allowing DSOs to procure flexibility on behalf of the TSO is not seen as
a big issue outside of GB. However, this is somewhat surprising and reflects the fact
that currently DSOs and TSOs are procuring very different types of flexibility and trying
to avoid direct competition or even direct contractual relationships. It is not clear how
sustainable this avoidance of conflict (and its resolution) is in the longer run.
Finally, most of jurisdictions are working on a common cost benefit methodology (of
the type that already exists in New York) to evaluate flexibility solutions. There is clearly
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a need for this and for it to be consistent with standard social cost benefit methodologies
being used by central and local government.
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METI Minister for Economy, Transport and Infrastructure—Japan
NEM National Electricity Market
NVE Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
OFGEM Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
SINTEG Schaufenster intelligente Energie—Digitale Agenda für die Energiewende
(Smart energy showcases—Digital agenda for the energy transition)
SSEN Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks
TSO Transmission System Operator
VPP Virtual Power Plant
WEM Wholesale Electricity Market
Appendix A. List of Participants
Country Organisation/Party Type of Party General View Project/Initiative Specific
Australia Ausgrid distribution utility yes (Ausgrid’s Battery VPP)




France Enedis distribution utility yes
Germany Avacon distribution utility yes (Avacon-InterFLEX project)
Bnetza regulator yes
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Country Organisation/Party Type of Party General View Project/Initiative Specific
Great Britain SSEN distribution utility











yes (marketplace for the
procurement of
flexibility services)
Piclo Flex (Piclo) marketplace
yes (marketplace for the
procurement of
flexibility services)
Ofgem energy regulator yes
ENA energy association yes
Japan Tepco distribution utility
yes (V2G Demonstrator project
using EVs and VPP resources)
Expert energy expert yes
Netherlands













Regulation and new roles of electricity distribution utilities, other parties and markets
1. How is your jurisdiction actively encouraging a move towards competitive procure-
ment of flexibility services at the distribution level? (e.g., innovation trials, changes to
regulation, changes to regulatory incentives).
2. What lessons, if any, have been learned about changes to regulatory arrangements
which would encourage more competitive procurement of flexibility services at the














Changes to definition of
products/service
standardisation













Specification of rules for peer
to peer trading of flexibility
Changes to smart meter
rules framework








New rules that allow
distribution utilities to






data management and access
Creation of standard cost
benefit methodology for the
evaluation of flexibility
services at distribution level
Other(s)? (Please specify):
3. In evaluating flexibility bids/offers, which of the following non-monetary/difficult to quantify aspects may be
taken into account by electricity distribution system operators?
Value Stream Already Allowed (Yes/No) Being Considered (Yes/No) Comments (If Any)
Carbon reduction
Road traffic/street level impact
Community scheme (e.g., as per
Community Credit in New York)
Value of resilience
Other(s)? (Please specify)
Please do refer us to any published regulatory documents that you think would be
particularly helpful for our study.
Questionnaire 2
Potential Regulatory Changes
1. Based on the experience of [your project/initiative], what are the most relevant
changes on regulation that would be necessary to facilitate and accelerate the trading
of flexibility services by electricity distribution utilities (from distributed energy
resources-DER, commercial/residential customers, etc.)?




Top 3 in Your View
Short Explanation
(Top 3 Only)
Changes to utilities’ revenue incentives
Changes to network tariff structure
Changes to definition of
products/service standardisation
Specification of market design for local
flexibility markets
Specification of rules for peer to peer trading
of flexibility
Changes to the smart meter rules framework
Changes to rules for independent aggregators
Encouragement of better interaction/
coordination between electricity distribution and
transmission system operators
New rules that allow distribution utilities to
procure flexibility on behalf of transmission level
system operators
Changes to feed-in-tariff regulation
Improvements to customer data management
and access
Creation of standard cost benefit methodology
for the evaluation of flexibility services at
distribution level
Other(s)? (Please specify):
Please do refer us to any published regulatory documents that you think would be
particularly helpful for our study.
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